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ABSTRACT  
 
There a paucity of systematic knowledge on the dynamics of rework in urban renewal 
projects even though such projects frequently exceed budget and schedule. The causal 
factors of rework and cost impact upon 69 Colombian public projects are examined. 
The nomenclature of Project, Organization and People (POP) is used to categorize 
causal variables and develop a generic systemic model of rework causation. Inadequate 
initial budgets, poor project design (which instigated changes during construction) and 
the socially inclusivity of contracts in Colombia (which employ local inexperienced 
people to conduct the required works), were the most significant contributors of rework. 
The developed model provides decision-makers and stakeholders with insights about 
the interdependencies and behaviour between key influencing variables in Colombian 
urban renewal projects and can be used to stimulate learning and process improvements 
in future projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Colombian economy has been experiencing considerable economic growth; 
Foreign Direct Investment and exports have increased (OECD, 2015). In 1998, for 
example, the Colombian government engaged in a transformation plan to re-develop 
and maintain its inner cities via the Decree 1504 (1998) and the Manual of Design and 
Construction of Public Spaces (Alcaldia de Cali, 2003). From 2001 the city of Medellin, 
for example, has experienced a renaissance in urban renewal (e.g., neighbourhood 
improvements and heritage conservation), which has been supported by several 
Municipal Development Plans (MDP) (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2001; 2004; 2012) and the 
encouragement of active citizen participation. The Medellin municipality consequently 
developed a local planning program entitled the ‘Participatory Budgeting Program’ 
(PBP) (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2010). The PBP provides motivation for active citizen 
participation in democratically organized local planning processes. The PBP also 
allocates public resources by prioritizing citizen’s infrastructural demands and needs, 
thus integrating development and the cities’ own local processes within their districts. 
Major defining characteristics of the PBP are (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2010): 
 each district’s representative submits the most important and urgent urban works 
(decided by the community) within the district to the municipality for review 
and budgetary assignment. This process normally takes one year from the 
proposal being submitted to works execution;   
 before construction initiation, a community socialization meeting is carried out;  
 the contractor must employ at least 80% of local (often, unskilled) people; 
 while subcontracting is prohibited in Colombian public works sector, it is 
permitted when specialization works are required such as paving and installation 
of handrails; and  
 when modifying a project’s scope, the community’s permission is required. 
 
These major defining characteristics of the PBP (such as employing unskilled people) 
provoked high indexes of rework in most projects under this program.  
Rework has been defined as the “unnecessary effort of re-doing an activity or process 
that was incomplete the first time” (Love 2002, p. 19). Rework often arises from design 
changes, errors and omissions that stem from scope uncertainty and the contracting 
strategy adopted (e.g., Burati et al., 1992; Love et al., 2011). The inherent degree of 
uncertainty that prevails within an urban renewal project’s scope creates a problematic 
issue, especially when information is unavailable.  Consequently, this affects decision-
makers’ choices during a project’s formative stages (Alessandri et al., 2004). In the 
absence of available knowledge, decisions made prior to, or during construction are 
erroneous and lead to disastrous consequences (Love et al., 2013). When uncertainty is 
high, initial drawings and specifications will invariably change, and the project team 
seek to resolve problems as they arise during construction. Once changes arise, they 
may be deemed to be ambiguous, erroneous and invariably require rework (Forcada et 
al., 2014).  
 
Rework has, on average, been found to contribute to 52% of a project’s total cost 
overrun and increase schedule overruns by as much as 22% (Love, 2002). Moreover, 
rework have been found to range from 5% to 20% of a contract’s value in construction 
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and engineering projects with design scope changes rework accounting for as much as 
50% of costs (e.g., Barber et al., 2000; Love and Edwards, 2004). Yet, limited 
knowledge exists about rework costs in urban renewal projects even though such costs 
negatively impact upon project performance and organizations’ profitability (Rogge et 
al., 2001; Love, 2002; Dissanayake et al., 2003; Love and Edwards, 2004; Fayeket al., 
2004; Palaneeswaran et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012; Forcada et al., 
2014). Essentially, urban renewal projects tend to focus on renovations, refurbishment, 
modernizations of transportation infrastructure (e.g., pavements, roads, stairways) and 
parks. There is a proclivity for such projects to be small and oriented to small facility 
maintenance and modification projects (Zhang et al., 2012) or rural transit projects with 
remote locations (Tran et al., 2015). 
 
Against this contextual backdrop, the causal nature of rework that arose in 69 
Colombian urban renewal projects under the PBP is examined. The findings are used to 
develop an influence diagram to determine the inter-relationships between variables that 
contributed to rework as well as time and cost variations that were experienced. The 
developed model provides decision-makers and stakeholders with an ameliorated 
understanding of rework dynamics and can be used as a tool to stimulate learning and 
process improvement. The paper commences with a description of the case study 
(including the data collection methods that were used) before presenting the 
nomenclature for rework causation. This nomenclature is then used to analyse the 
rework causation and develop the dynamics of rework in the provided case study. 
Results are then discussed and conclusions are drawn.  
 
1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
A case study should investigate the technical aspects of a contemporary phenomenon 
within a real life context, particularly in critical and unique circumstances (Yin, 1984). 
It is particularly useful when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
difficult to ascertain and when multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984). A 
case study provides analytical rather than pure statistical generalizations and can capture 
the complexity and dynamism of organizational settings in projects (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
For these reasons, this research adopts a case study approach to examine underlying 
dynamics that contribute to rework in urban renewal projects. 
 
1.1. CASE BACKGROUND 
 
Urban renewal projects in the city of Medellin (Colombia) within the PBP provide the 
paper’s case study setting. These projects include the construction of sidewalks, curbs, 
stairways, supply and installation of road protections, handrails and complementary 
works in different parts of the district. A traditional lump sum contract was employed 
where the Secretaría de Obras Públicas acted as the contracting party for all projects. 
The initial contract value was 486.431.898 COL$ (Colombian peso (1€=2,500 COL$)) 
and the initial contract duration was 120 days; this included 49 projects within 17 
districts. However, the contract grew to finally encompass 69 small independent 
subprojects within 21 geographical districts of the city. Hence, the revised contract 
value was increased to 717,310,539 COL$ and the contract duration to 180 days. 
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Despite being a single contract, each district was independent in terms of budget 
allocation and could not transfer funds to other districts. Similarly, there was neither a 
specific planning policy for the execution of works nor a sequence of order for the 
projects. However, there was a global milestone for the execution of the entire program 
of works but no independent milestones individual projects. Figure 1 presents areas of 
the city prior to the commencement of construction works.  
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of different areas of the city before carrying out the works 
 
 
1.2. DATA COLLECTION 
 
The research team acted as non-participant observers throughout the duration of on-site 
data collection, which commenced from the construction phase. The team also utilized 
their industrial experience to identify rework events that occurred while inspecting 
historical contract documentation such as site instructions, change order requests, 
requests for information and drawing changes. To categorise events as rework, 
validation was sought from the contractor’s project manager, site foreman, and client’s 
representative. Every attempt was made to avoid disrupting the workflow of the site 
management team and workers or bias their responses to questions posed. However, as 
the research relied on reports of individuals’ historical events, some biases due to recall 
and self-preservation were inevitable.  
 
Thus, independent verification of the ensuing discourse generated by interviewees was 
confirmed using multiple sources and triangulation to obtain a balanced view of events. 
Specifically, triangulation cross checked for internal consistency and reliability, and 
tested the data’s external validity. Documentation provided by the administration (e.g. 
contract information and payment orders) and unstructured interviews with project team 
members (e.g. client’s representative, contractor, site managers and subcontractors) 
represented primary sources of information for determining both the causes and costs of 
rework experienced. Once a rework event was identified, all respective parties involved 
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with identification and rectification were interviewed to elicit a balanced view of the 
event. Interview data and narratives were then transcribed and given to the interviewee 
to check for any discrepancies that may have arisen.  
 
 
1.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interview narratives and textual content obtained from secondary documentation 
were then analysed using the QSR NVivo 9 software. This software has the inherent 
capability to organize and analyse unstructured qualitative information, words and 
concepts with powerful processes of indexing and theorising. This enabled the research 
team to quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of words and 
concepts, as well as draw inferences about the messages contained within the texts. It 
also enabled additional data sources such as web pages and journal notes to be 
incorporated into the analysis in the pursuit of identifying new emergent themes. QSR 
NVivo 9 facilitated an organic approach to coding by enabling triggers or categories of 
textural interest to be coded and used to monitor emerging and developing ideas 
(Kvale, 1996). This coding can be modified, integrated or migrated as the analysis 
progresses and facilitates the recognition of conflicts and contradictions (Morse and 
Richards 2002). Coding was undertaken systematically to ensure all data was treated 
equally. As an initial step, all interview transcripts were read in their entirety and notes 
made by members of the research team. These initial notes were used to formulate 
categories, connect themes, and help develop contextual relationships between themes. 
  
The analysis commenced by examining themes associated with ‘change’, ‘error’, ‘cost’ 
and ‘mistakes’. Using an in-built function within QSR NVivo 9, words with similar 
meanings such as mistake and error were identified in selected materials (‘sources’). 
This functionality enabled the research team to manoeuvre from one data source to the 
next using features called ‘doc links’, ‘node links’ and ‘data links’. The process adopted 
involved creating ‘nodes’ to mark relevant concepts and topics in text documents that 
were subsequently searched and analysed. The analysis revealed a high degree of 
interdependency existed between perceived rework sources. This resulted in the 
nomenclature of Project, Organization and  People (POP) to be adopted akin to 
previous research conducted by Love et al., (2012) and Forcada et al., (2014), where 
the:  
 
1. Project includes scope definition; wrong initial budget; lack or inadequate design; 
deterioration of the site regarding natural accidents; pressure to start work(s) 
execution; lack of clarity of citizen needs and specifications; type of procurement 
path; vandalism; climatic conditions and specifically inclement weather; and 
interferences with existing public services.  
2. Organization includes lack of supervision; design changes; unexpected events; 
inadequate quality of execution; slow client resolution; inadequate budget 
management: third party problems: and inadequate resources management. 
3. People includes lack of experience and expertise; and stress. 
 
2. REWORK CAUSATION 
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The selected projects experienced significant cost variations due to changes, errors and 
omissions, which resulted in rework occurrence. Despite its presence, rework was not 
formally measured or acknowledged as there was a negative perception that ‘admission’ 
would damage the contractor’s corporate reputation. However, the administration was 
curious to know ‘why’ and ‘how’ project rework arose. Through direct observation and 
subsequent analyse of interviews and documentation, the incidences and their causes, 
description, budget and cost modifications were detailed. Table 1 presents an example 
of the description of incidences that occurred. 
 
Rework incidence Cause Description Responsible 
Time 
increase 
Cost 
increase 
The client requested to continue the 
platform until connecting it 
Scope 
definition 
Extra work 
Client 
- - 
Pavement demolition was required 
to give continuity to curbs. 
Extra work 3 days 41.15% 
The big rock found in the excavation 
was required to bring it to the 
dumping site. 
Additional 
work 
4 days 2.49% 
The design lacked of platform. It 
had to be built. 
Wrong initial 
budget 
Additional 
work 
Client - 9.60% 
The exact location of the platform 
had to be decided on site. 
Lack or 
inadequate 
design 
Only general 
details were 
received 
Client - - 
Execution delays 
Lack or 
inadequate 
design 
Lack of works 
and procedure 
definition.  
End users 
(community) 
3 days - 
Lack of 
experience 
Workers didn't 
know how to 
carry out the 
work. 
Contractor - - 
Site managers requested changing 
the design. 
Lack of clarity 
Lack of 
communication 
between parties 
Client 1 day - 
Low efficiency 
Type of 
contract 
Workers didn't 
know how to 
carry out the 
work. 
Client 
- - 
Stress 
Due to scope 
changes, errors 
and unexpected 
events. 
Contractor 
Table 1. Example of the description of the incidences occurred in a project 
 
From the analysis of rework incidences a taxonomy of causes based upon POP was 
developed and is presented in Table 2. The POP taxonomy enabled common factors 
contributing to rework to be identified prior to further examining each sub-project. The 
common significant factors influencing rework were identified as: 
 
 Wrong initial budget: Poor documentation and technical designs/ specifications that 
were based solely upon the district representative’s request (without on-site technical 
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inspection and validation) brought many scope and budget modifications. For 
example, excavations with significant slope did not include a retaining wall. These 
extra works significantly increased construction costs and delayed the programme of 
works. Many of these rework events could be directly attributed to the: district 
representative’s slow acceptance of changes; absence of technical site visits; and 
necessity of ordering new materials, and subsequent employment of specialized staff 
for the works. Other consequences of an inaccurate initial budget were: uncertainty 
and stress due to constant changes and new situations; a significant increase of work 
with the available resources; and overall confusion for the termination of works. This 
situation could have been avoided with the provision of accurate information design; 
 Lack or inadequate design: Poor initial documentation created constant delays 
during construction works because of a lack of design clarity and supporting 
technical advice; the client’s inability to reach resolution on design changes further 
exacerbated these problems. For example, project commencement was delayed by 10 
days because the client had not approved key information;  
 Scope definition: Scope changes were closely related to poor design documentation 
and erroneous initial budget calculations; 
 Type of contract: The inherent degree of uncertainty within the scope of projects 
under PBP and in general of an urban improvement project created a problematic 
issue (Alessandri et al., 2004). The absence of detailed project design, inadequate 
allocation of budget and bureaucratic indecisions prior to, or during construction may 
lead to cost and schedule increases being experienced (Love et al., 2013). The 
obligation to seek permission via community socialization meetings before 
commencing (or changing) the works together with the requirement to hire 80% of 
unskilled labour from the district’s citizens, were identified as contributory to 
rework; 
 Inadequate economic solvency and inadequate budget management: The contractor’s 
poor financial position was aggravated by inadequate budgetary management when 
allocating material and equipment resources amongst the various projects. In turn, 
resources shortages occurred, which result in rework and delays; 
 Weather conditions: High temperatures and sporadic torrential rains caused the 
temporary suspension of some work – such incidents could only be classified under 
the heading of force majeure but better planning would be reduced the 
impact of inclement weather; 
 Lack of experience: Workers’ inexperience and incompetence resulted in substandard 
quality works such as: mixing incorrect proportions of grouting materials; failing to 
determining the correct thickness of concrete; and failing to ensure that surfaces were 
even, level and smooth (as per contractual specifications). Extreme pressure to 
complete works further exacerbated issues concerning the lack of works precision 
and led to repairs, scope changes, rework and delays;  
 Unviable works: Unviable works appeared when a project or an activity could not be 
performed according to the contract content due to errors in the design 
documentation or a lack of resources allocated to that activity or project. Some 
designs were developed only with the request forms provided by the district’s 
representative without ensuring the real location and situation of the site. 
Consequently, many errors appeared in the contract documentation. Several unviable 
projects were then redefined or replaced for other necessary works in the district. 
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District 1                                       
 1 * * *     * *                     * * 
 2 * * *               *   * *     * * * 
 3   *     *                       *     
 4         *           *     *     * * * 
 5                               *       
 6 * * *       * * *                   * 
 7   *           *                   *   
District 2                                       
 8 * * *           *             * *     
 9 * *     *   *  *     *   * *         * 
 10   *       * *                         
 11   *                                   
District 3                                       
 12 * * *               *   *   *         
 13 * *                                   
 14 y 69       *                               
 15 * *               *     *             
 68 *   * *         * *         *       * 
District 4                                       
 16 *     *                     *       * 
District 5                                       
 17       *        *   * *     * * * *   * 
 18   *                                   
 19 * *   * * *   * *     *     * * * * * 
District 6                                       
 20 *     *     * * *           *         
 21       *                               
 22 *             *                  *   * 
 23 *                                     
District 7                                       
 24 * *         *   * *             *     
 25       *                               
 26 * *   *     *   *         *     *   * 
District 8                                       
 27 * *                           *       
 28 * *                                   
 29   *                                   
 30   *                                   
 31   *                                   
 32   *                                   
District 9                                       
 33 * *     *   *           *       * * * 
 9 
 
District 10                                       
 34 * *                                   
                                      
 35 *     * *   *         *     *   *   * 
 36 * * *   *   *       *   * * *   * *   
 37 * *    *                               
 38   *                                   
 39 * *                                   
District 12                                       
 40 *                                     
District 13                                       
 41 * *     *       *               * * * 
District 14                                       
 42 * *                 *   * *       *   
 43       *                               
 44             *           *   *         
 45       *                               
District 15                                       
 46 y 67 * *     *         *   * *   *       * 
 47       *                                
District 16                                       
 48 *     * * *           * *   *       * 
District 17                                       
 49 *   *     *           *     *         
District 18                                       
 50 *           *               *         
 51   * *                                 
 52   * *                                 
District 19                                       
 53 * *                   *     *         
 54   *                                   
 55       *                               
 56             *                         
 57       *                               
 58 * * *                                 
 59   * *                                 
District 20                                       
 60 * *               *         *         
 61   *         *                         
 62   *                                   
 63 * *                   *               
 64        *                               
 65 *           *                         
District 21                                       
 66 * *       * *     *     *   *   * *   
Table 2. Factors influencing rework in each project 
 
It was identified that initial budgetary plans were a primary cause of rework; perhaps 
due to issues to optimism bias. A detailed analysis of such costs within each project was 
carried out. Table 3 presents a summary of analysis disaggregated by district and 
includes the: awarded budget; corrected budget (awarded budget modified and adapted 
to the work to be completed); rework costs due to unexpected events; rework costs due 
to scope modifications by the client; and final executed budget.  
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District 1 33,055,363 30,098,080 104,313 2,864,184 33,066,576 9.8 0.3 
 
8.7 11,214 25 
District 2 41,843,546 41,589,576 274,950 99,787,916 42,085,595 0.6 0.7 
 
237.1 242,049 3 
District 3 58,151,730 26,414,940 117,000 38,826,860 60,042,426 120.1 0.2 
 
64.7 1,890,696 14 
District 4 16,764,998 16,764,998 0 10,256,630 17,167,689 0.0 0.0 
 
59.7 402,691 42 
District 5 34,244,549 29,654,045 0 4,139,404 33,883,993 15.5 0.0 
 
12.2 -360,556 
 District 6 35,311,345 38,146,683 0 55,490,710 31,954,480 -7.4 0.0 
 
173.7 -3,356,865 57 
District 7 32,774,575 22,515,526 0 16,105,560 32,972,380 45.6 0.0 
 
48.8 197,805 11 
District 8 30,605,841 30,389,646 0 1,612,380 32,002,026 0.7 0.0 
 
5.0 1,396,185 1 
District 9 14,605,428 13,162,156 73,500 1,162,039 14,678,785 11.0 0.5 
 
7.9 73,358 20 
District 10 14,605,428 10,818,231 0 4,000,890 14,706,621 35.0 0.0 
 
27.2 101,194 0 
District 11 34,996,966 20,918,044 104,290 18,321,261 34,005,873 67.3 0.3 
 
53.9 -991,094 41 
District 12 17,134,825 17,134,825 0 0 17,134,375 0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 -450 0 
District 13 14,638,779 14,241,559 0 0 14,241,559 2.8 0.0 
 
0.0 -397,220 2 
District 14 31,987,329 17,056,405 14,285,240 712,616 32,054,261 87.5 44.6 
 
2.2 66,933 2 
District 15 75,375,900 37,290,775 0 51,164,610 60,714,303 102.1 0.0 
 
84.3 -14,661,598 36 
District 16 46,915,889 47,593,843 22,078,633 5,804,701 50,520,528 -1.4 43.7 
 
11.5 3,604,639 13 
District 17 26,874,633 29,503,283 0 21,303,145 31,765,260 -8.9 0.0 
 
67.1 4,890,628 15 
District 18 21,421,953 18,146,895 0 15,210,580 21,250,219 18.0 0.0 
 
71.6 -171,734 3 
District 19 65,431,101 48,783,130 0 57,201,506 65,426,153 34.1 0.0 
 
87.4 -4,949 10 
District 20 48,098,130 31,543,880 93,359 17,171,406 48,883,646 52.5 0.2 
 
35.1 785,516 10 
District 21 22,472,234 21,890,043 1,572,025 4,959,475 25,528,918 2.7 6.2 
 
19.4 3,056,684 17 
Total %      28.0 4.6  51.3   
Total (days)          322 
Total COL$ 717,310,539 563,656,561 38,703,309 426,095,874 714,085,664     -3,224,875 
 Total € 302,663 237,830 16,331 179,787 301,302 
    
-1,361 
  
Table 3. Analysis of the budget and costs of rework by district 
Since many inconsistences between the design and what was actually documented were 
found (and with the aim to analyze the real costs of rework), the budget was 
recalculated to produce a corrected one accommodated actual work undertaken.   
 
On average, the awarded budget was 28% above the corrected budget, illustrating that 
the budget was inflated. Had a detailed analysis of work activities been carried out 
during the design process, then this aforementioned inflation could have been avoided. 
It is estimated that tighter budgetary control and a detailed design at the outset of project 
inception could have saved 153,653,978 COL$. Yet, the contract did not allocate any 
contingency for schedule nor cost overruns. In fact, the final executed budget was 
3,224,875 COL$ less than the awarded budget mainly because one project was not 
carried out. Hence, when comparing the final executed budget to the awarded budget 
there is no cost increase. However, many budget modifications and budget exchanges 
were made between projects from the same district and sought not to overtake the 
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awarded budget. By comparing the final executed budget with the corrected budget, a 
21.1% increase in the corrected budget was recorded and was attributed to scope 
changes that transpired as cost and time overruns.   
 
The contributors of rework can be categorized into various dichotomous groups such as 
client related, design related and contractor related factors (Love and Edwards 2004). 
Rework costs due to execution errors and management problems were incurred by the 
contractor, while rework costs due to scope modifications (client and design related 
factors) were incurred by the client but had to be allocated in the awarded budget. The 
wrong initial budget stemmed from an inaccurate design and provoked an awarded 
budget 28% above that forecasted; constant modifications and scope changes created by 
a lack of design clarity and the client’s inability to reach timely resolution were the most 
important factor of cost increase. The average percent of rework costs due to design 
scope modifications by the client in each district, accounted for 51.3% of the project’s 
total cost (including non-realized works). These results are in line with those previously 
reported upon by Barber et al. (2000) and Love and Edwards (2004). This cost increase 
was absorbed by other project modifications and by changing specifications. Rework 
costs due to unexpected events, accounted for 4.6% of the project’s total cost. These 
costs were mainly due to the workers’ lack of experience/ incompetence, pressure to 
finish works, stress and inadequate budget management when allocating material and 
equipment resources. These costs were absorbed by the contractor. 
Table 3 illustrates that 322 days of schedule overrun were experienced and negatively 
affected the management of workmanship, materials and machinery by creating 
necessary changes and rework, and increasing cost. As some projects were carried out 
in parallel, any delays occurring in one district did not necessarily affect others. The 
development of projects in parallel helped deliver the contract in the 180 expected days. 
However, additional resources were commandeered and tasks were carried out 
concurrently. The reactionary scenario described is commonly referred to as Brookes 
Law (Cooper 1980). By pushing beyond the limits of acceptable levels of concurrency, 
complexity increases and destabilises the project (Cooper 1980). This further 
exacerbates the time to complete tasks, particularly when revisions, repairs and rework occur 
(Cooper 1980, Love 2002). 
 
 
3. DYNAMICS OF REWORK 
The analysis revealed that the causation of rework could not be attributed to a single 
factor – rather, a number of complex and interrelated factors were responsible. 
Consequently, a generic causal model was produced to demonstrate the existing 
interdependency between these factors (Table 2). This model took an account of these 
factors via direct observations, interviews with all the parties and documentary sources 
for the 69 projects. This information was subsequently integrated and implemented in a 
generic influence diagram (Figure 2). The arrows that link each variable indicate a place 
where a cause and effect relationship exists, while the plus or minus sign at the head of 
each arrow indicates the direction of causality between the variables. 
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Figure 2.Generic influence diagram of rework 
 
Unexpected situations such as inconsistencies between scope, budget and schedule, 
unanticipated problems or changes often initiate a series of dynamics that can provoke 
rework and thus, create substantial cost and schedule modifications (Forcada et al., 
2014). For example, inadequate or incomplete designs and specifications increased the 
scope of works to be undertaken. In the case of Colombia urban renewal projects, the 
type of public contracts impact on rework and as a result, on the whole project’s 
performance.  
 
A lack of vernacular skills and knowledge within the community hindered scope 
development, increased workload and subsequently, subjected consultants to schedule 
pressure. Consequently, design errors and omissions arose within contract 
documentation. This was mainly because technical visits, reviews and verifications 
where not undertaken (Love et al., 2010a). Such errors and omissions were not 
identified until construction was being undertaken and therefore, a huge quantity of 
design modifications arose. Koskela and Huovila (1997) and Love et al. (1999) suggest 
that a design freeze should be applied as early as possible to minimise rework 
occurrence. A design freeze would have been effective only if highly skilled 
professionals developed the client’s project brief to their requirements and effectively 
communicated this brief to all contractual participants involved. The time to rectify any 
error can affect the work’s progress, require a costly design change and/ or lead to 
unscheduled programme overruns. Design errors identified during the construction 
phase are often the mostly costly to rectify (Burati et al., 1992; Love and Li 2000; Love 
et al., 2008).  
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Inconsistences between actual construction work and specifications contained in the 
contract documentation were an important contributor to rework. In fact, scope 
uncertainty is an innate feature of Colombian urban renewal projects under the PBP. 
During this research, it emerged that the lack of technical visits by the municipality 
when defining the project’s scope and end users’ (community) inexperience in defining 
project needs also contributed to rework during construction (Palaneeswaran et al, 
2008). The municipality allocated the budget to each project based on the community 
needs but a comprehensive design was not developed. The lack of technical visits when 
defining the project’s scope and design generated many changes that had to be approved 
by the community; where the latter were slow to reach resolution thus creating further 
delays and rework. It was apparent that the community lacked construction knowledge 
and were bound by a protracted group decision-making process – in turn, this led to 
partial stops of work and schedule overruns. Furthermore, the extended period between 
drawing up the project and executing it caused deteriorations of several sites. Therefore, 
modifications in the scope were normal in all projects.  
Colombian urban renewal projects have tended to be procured using the traditional 
lump sum methods (e.g., design-bid-construct). However, scope uncertainty and lack of 
contractor involvement during design provoked design changes and increased the initial 
awarded budget (Love et al., 2013). The wrong budget management coupled with the 
contractor’s low financial capacity further exacerbated delays and cost increases. 
Contractor economic problems delayed the materials and equipment supply that led to 
imprecise execution procedures and further delays and cost increases as a result of 
rework. Similarly, productivity was affected by work quality, availability of 
prerequisites, out-of-sequence work, schedule pressure, morale, skill and experience, 
organizational size changes and overtime (Lyneis and Cooper 2001). The need to 
employ 80% of local workers  generated construction errors due to the worker’s lack of 
experience, knowledge and competence. As the project progressed and construction 
errors became increasingly prevalent, the contractor spent a disproportionate amount of 
time resolving problems that arose. For these small and geographically distributed sites, 
staff supervision is quintessentially important in controlling the quality of construction 
works via front-line managers and the workforce.  
 
Previous research undertaken by Love (2002) for example revealed that there were no 
significant differences between procurement methods and rework costs. However, the 
case study analyzed in this paper reveals that the characteristics of the procurement path 
were a contributor to rework. In these cases, a proportion of rework costs were 
attributable to execution errors and management problems by the contractor, while costs 
due to scope modifications were naturally incurred by the client. However, under PBP 
rework costs due to scope modifications had to be allocated in the awarded budget 
provoking budget exchanges between projects so as not to overtake the awarded budget.  
 
The special characteristics of the urban renewal projects (such as rehabilitating 
deteriorated infrastructures) can require significant investment. To improve the 
performance of these projects, strategies for life-cycle risk mitigation are needed 
(Hastak and Baim, 2001). The risk associated within an event is a combination of the 
probability of that event occurring in the time frame under consideration and severity of 
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its occurrence. Where more complex events are involved, the risk is traditionally 
defined as the summation of associated individual events, weighted according to the 
degree of importance of each individual event (Rescher 1983). In the context of the 
research presented the identification of rework causation is understood by considering 
the whole project system holistically and how variables dynamically interact (Love and 
Edwards 2004; Aljassmi and Han, 2013; Li and Taylor, 2014).   
 
Further research is required to identify the probability of occurrence between the 
identified causal factors and rework levels (Love and Edwards 2004).  Once the 
probability of occurrence between the identified causal factors and rework levels can be 
determined, this model will provide the public sector with an objective assessment of 
the likelihood of rework levels given prevailing conditions. However, the procurement 
processes to which Colombian urban renewal projects are subject exposes to corruption 
(Signor et al 2016). Procurement is one of the biggest areas of internal weakness to 
corruption risk. Public contracts in Colombia are awarded based on the lowest price. 
Lowest price bidding is more likely to result in time and cost overruns due to 
opportunistic behavior of contractors, which can lead to poor value for money and 
significantly higher whole life costs (Love et al 2012).  
Lump sum contracting stimulates contractors to bid for work at unrealistically low 
levels. It then becomes difficult for them to maintain standards and obtain optimum 
profits, the quality of their work falls and they become more likely to make claims 
(which may be unjustified in many instances), delay payments to subcontractors and 
indulge in corrupt behavior to reduce their losses. To mitigate corruption risks reforms 
to the public procurement processes should be implemented while contractors could 
help by maintaining high ethical standards in their own operations.  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
While limited systematic knowledge is available on construction rework dynamics, 
generic models of rework have been developed for building civil engineering projects 
(Love et al., 2011, Forcada et al., 2014), residential apartments (Love et al., 1999 and 
Love et al., 2008) and for complex hydrocarbon (oil and gas) projects (Love et al., 
2011). These aforementioned studies revealed that rework experienced was 
predominantly generated from the project’s conception and design stages - poor quality 
documentation and design errors led to changes being implemented during construction. 
These previous findings resonate with those obtained from this research, particularly, a 
lack of design and errors in allocating the budget were predominant factors leading to 
rework. However, the causes of these design errors were very different from those 
obtained in other previous research. Special characteristics of public contracts in 
Colombia were determinant on the occurrence of rework. The obligation to conduct 
community socialization meetings to seek permissions before commencing works, or 
when a change was required, also generated rework.  
Although the generic systemic model of rework for other civil engineering projects has 
already been developed, their complexity and the characteristics of such projects are 
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very different from the case study presented in this paper. Specifically, urban renewal 
projects are unique and more akin to those of restoration (Tran et al 2015). For larger 
complex projects, the management team’s skill levels enable efficient and effective 
coordination and integration of project participants as a means of reducing rework 
(Love et al., 1999 and Love et al., 2008; Love et al., 2011; Forcada et al., 2014).  
Regarding coordination aspects, the contractor’s ability to manage financial matters and 
solvency when allocating material, equipment and workmanship resources were also a 
cause of rework. In contrast to highway infrastructures assets, the reduced area and 
scope of each project reduced the need to deal with surrounding aspects such as traffic 
during the construction process. 
Undertaking design reviews and verifications is the first step to minimizing the potential 
impact of errors, but these practices will not prevent them from occurring. With this in 
mind, consideration needs to be given to employing an adviser for the community 
representative who has sufficient construction skills and knowledge to define 
specifications and to changing the procurement path such that greater shared 
responsibility is placed on all contractual parties (Love and Edwards 2004, 
Palaneeswaran et al 2014). 
If job creation is the reason of contracting unskilled personnel, training must be 
provided in order to improve work practices. If municipalities do not begin to re-
examine their contract clauses and procedures, then there is a danger that errors become 
a norm and adversely impact on their overall profitability and the performance of the 
projects that they are involved with. Selection of contractors based on experience and 
solvency and making sure that resources are available to undertake the required work 
are other suggestions to minimize errors and thus reduce rework. Municipalities should 
pay increasing attention to effectively managing their human resources and 
implementing quality management practices. 
The constant urban transformation of Colombian cities due to the MDP, the 
infrastructural demands of this country and this study’s findings suggest that other 
public projects that are currently underway should be scrutinised. The methodology 
adopted for the analysis presented in this paper might be used to analyse the factors that 
contribute to rework in public building projects and then enhance understanding about 
the dynamics of rework and develop improvement strategies.  The findings of this 
research are directly applicable to other South American countries such as Brazil, 
Mexico and Chile were the urban development projects are also awarded under the PBP. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In Colombia, the dynamics of rework in urban improvement projects is largely 
unknown, this despite the fact that construction works are often neither properly defined 
nor executed. Consequently, project performance is reduced significantly by 
unnecessary instances of rework. In this paper, the factors contributing to rework on 69 
urban improvement projects in the city of Medellin, Colombia, were identified and used 
to produce a generic systemic model that illustrates the relationships between variables. 
An analysis of rework costs, initial awarded budget and modified budget provided 
clarity on the causes of scope and budget modifications encountered. The research 
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findings differ greatly from those civil engineering and construction rework analysis 
and therefore, confirm that the rework phenomena is particular to the type of project, 
type of contract, magnitude and location of  projects. The Participatory Budget Program 
(PBP), which is focused on citizen participation, is the main difference between this 
case study and others within the extant literature. Budget relocation and delays in 
activities were common in all projects. However, thanks to parallel activities the project 
did not exceed on time neither on cost.  
 
On average, the awarded budget was inflated. A comparison between the ‘awarded’  
and ‘corrected’ budget, revealed that the awarded budget was 16.4% above the real 
corrected budget. This situation occurred because of: i) a detailed analysis of planned 
construction works was not conducted during the design process; and ii) a shortage of 
technical visits during the design process was apparent. Various problems encountered 
included: technical measurements for many of the projects were incorrect; non-viable 
works or not required activities; necessary works were sometimes omitted from the 
designs or budgets. Therefore, many budget modifications and budget exchanges 
between projects from the same district were carried out to balance costs and spend the 
entire awarded budget. The corrected budget was calculated to obtain the real deviation 
based on real quantities to be executed. Scope errors and poor design documentation, 
generated additional changes and rework which inflated the final executed budget to be 
21.1% of the corrected budget. The most important factors contributing to rework were 
the: wrong initial budget derived from an inaccurate design; constant modifications and 
scope changes provoked by the lack of clarity about the works; and slow client 
resolution on queries. Although rework costs due to the client’s scope modifications, 
accounted for 51.3% of the project’s total cost, this cost increase was incurred by other 
project modifications and by changing specifications. Rework costs due to unexpected 
events, accounted for 4.6% of the project’s total cost but incurred by the contractor. 
These costs were mainly due worker inexperience, pressure to finish works, stress and 
inadequate budget management when allocating material and equipment resources.  
 
The contribution of the city’s inhabitants is fundamental to defining urban improvement 
actions. However, the PBP does not include advising the community on technical 
aspects when defining their needs and thus produces technically unviable solutions. 
Municipalities should guide initiatives and help districts address their needs, whilst 
communities should understand that these initiatives aim to improve the city in a 
homogenous whole. Understanding how variables that contribute to rework inter-react 
with one another provides a new insight that could lead to behavioural adjustment. This 
may be achieved by formally recognizing rework as a key performance indicator within 
urban improvement contracts and linking it to a risk/reward model of compensation. It 
is suggested that this would stimulate learning and process improvements for future 
similar projects. Future research should focus on developing probabilities and better 
define the potential impact of risks that arise from the contract documentation process. 
The use of probabilistic network models, such Bayesian networks could present a 
suitable tool for measuring and managing rework in projects due to their ability to take 
into causal relations.   
 17 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alcaldia de Medellin. (2010).  “ABC Planeación Local y Presupuesto participativo.” 
Medellin.  
Alcaldia de Medellin. (2012). “Plan de Desarrollo · 2012 – 2015 Medellín, un hogar 
para la vida.” Medellin.  
Alcaldia de Medellin. (2001). “Plan de Desarrollo 2001-2003 Una Antioquia Nueva.” 
Medellin. 
Alcaldia de Medellin. (2004). “Plan de Desarrollo 2004-2007 Una Antioquia Nueva un 
hogar para la vida.” Medellin. 
Alcaldia de Cali. (2003). “Manual de diseño y construcción de los componentes del 
espacio público.” Cali. 
Aljassmi, H. and Han, S. (2013). “Analysis of causes of construction defects using fault 
trees and risk importance measures.” Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000653, 870-880. 
Alessandri, T., Ford, D., Lander, D., Leggio, K. and Taylor, M. (2004). "Managing risk 
and uncertainty in complex capital projects." The Quarterly review of economics 
and finance, 44(5): 751-767.  
Barber, P., Sheath, D., Tomkins, C. and Graves, A. (2000). "The cost of quality failures 
in major civil engineering projects." International Journal of Quality and Reliability 
Management, 17(4/5): 479-492.  
Burati, J.L., Farrington, J.J. and Ledbetter, W.B. (1992). "Causes of quality deviations 
in design and construction." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
118(1): 34-49. 
Cooper, K.G. (1980). "Naval shipyard production: a claim settled and a framework 
built." Interfaces, 10(6):30-36. 
Dissanayake, G.M.,  Fayek, A.R., Campero, O. and Wolf, H. (2003). "Measuring and 
classifying construction field rework: a pilot study." Proceedings CSCE Annual 
Conference, 5th Construction Specialty Conference, Moncton, N.B., June 4-7, 
published on CD-ROM, 1-7. 
Fayek, A.R. (2004). "Developing a standard methodology for measuring and classifying 
construction field rework." Canadian journal of civil engineering, 31(6): 1077-
1089.  
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). "Five misunderstandings about case-study research." Qualitative 
Inquiry, 12(2):219-245. 
Forcada, N., Rusiñol, G., Macarulla, M. and Love, P.E.D. (2014). “Rework in highway 
projects.” Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 20(4): 445-465. 
Hastak M., and Baim.J. (2001) “Risk Factors Affecting Management and Maintenance 
Cost of Urban Infrastructure.” Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 7(2): 67-76. 
Hwang, B., Thomas, S.R., Haas, C.T. and Caldas, C.H. (2009). "Measuring the Impact 
of Rework on Construction Cost Performance." Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364, 135:3(187), 187-198.   
ICEX, España Exportación e Inversiones (2012). "Situación actual del sector de la 
infraestructura en Colombia." Oficina Económica y Comercial de la Embajada de 
España en Bogotá. 
Koskela, L. and Huovila, P. (1997). “On Foundations of Concurrent Engineering.” Proc. 
Concurrent Engineering in Construction CEC'97. 
 18 
 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, 
Sage, Thousand Oaks, USA.  
Li, Y. and Taylor, T. (2014). "Modeling the impact of design rework on transportation 
infrastructure construction project performance." Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 0.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000878, 04014044. 
Love P. E. D. and Li H. (2000). "Quantifying the causes and costs of rework in 
construction." Construction Management and Economics, 18(4) 479–490. 
Love, P.E.D., Mandal, P. & Li, H. (1999). "Determining the causal structure of rework 
influences in construction." Construction Management and Economics, 17(4): 505-
517. 
Love, P.E.D. (2002). "Influence of Project Type and Procurement Method on Rework 
Costs in Building Construction Projects." Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 128(1):18-29.  
Love, P.E.D. and Edwards, D.J. (2004). "Forensic project management: The underlying 
causes of rework in construction projects." Civil Engineering and Environmental 
Systems, 21(3):207-228.  
Love, P.E.D., Edwards, D.J., and Irani, Z. (2008). "Forensic project management: An 
exploratory examination of the causal behavior of design-induced error." IEEE 
Transactions in Engineering Management, 55(2):234-248. 
Love, P.E.D., Edwards, D., Watson, H. and Davis, P. (2010). "Rework in Civil 
Infrastructure Projects: Determination of Cost Predictors." Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000136, 275-282. 
Love, P.E.D., Edwards, D.J., Irani, Z. and Goh, Y.M. (2011). "Dynamics of rework in 
complex offshore hydrocarbon projects." Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 0.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000377, 1060-1070. 
Love, P.E.D., Edwards, D.J. and Irani, Z. (2012). "Moving beyond optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation: An explanation for social infrastructure project cost 
overruns." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 59(3):560-571. 
Love, P., Wang, X., Sing, C., and Tiong, R. (2013). ”Determining the Probability of 
Project Cost Overruns.” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000575, 321-330. 
Lyneis, J.M., Cooper, K.G. and Els, S. (2001). "Strategic management of complex 
projects: a case study using system dynamics." System Dynamics Review, 
17(3):237-260.  
Morse, J. and Richards, L. (2002). Readme first for a user's guide to qualitative 
methods. London, Sage Publications. 
OECD (2015). "Estudios económicos de la OECD Colombia, Enero 2015, Visión 
General". 
Palaneeswaran, E., Love, P.E.D., Kumaraswamy, M.M. and  Ng, T.S.T. (2008). 
"Mapping rework causes and effects using artificial neural networks." Building 
research and information, 36(5):450-465. 
Palaneeswaran, E., Love, P., and Kim, J. (2014). "Role of Design Audits in Reducing 
Errors and Rework: Lessons from Hong Kong." Journal of Performance of 
Constructed Facilities, 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000450, 511-517. 
Presidente de la República de Colombia, (1998). "Decree 1504 for the development and 
maintenance of public space." Colombia. 
Rescher, N. (1983). Risk: A philosophical introduction to the theory of risk evaluation 
and management, University Press of America, Washington, D.C. 
 19 
 
Rogge, D.F., Cogliser, C., Alaman, H. and McCormack, S. (2001). "An investigation of 
field rework in industrial Construction." Construction Industry Institute, University 
of Texas at Austin, Austin, Tex.  
Signor, R., Love, P., and Olatunji, O. (2016). "Determining Overpricing in Brazilian 
Infrastructure Projects: A Forensic Approach." Journal of Cosntruction Engineering 
and Management, 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001156 , 06016001. 
Tran, D., Hallowell, M., and Molenaar, K. (2015). "Construction Management 
Challenges and Best Practices for Rural Transit Projects." Journal of Management 
in Engineering, 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000297, 04014072. 
Williamson, O. (1979). "Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual 
relations." The Journal of Law and Economics 22(2):233-261.  
Yin, Robert K., (1984). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, 
Newbury Park. 
Zhang, D., Haas, C., Goodrum, P., Caldas, C. and Granger, R. (2012). “Construction 
Small Projects Rework Reduction for Capital Facilities.” Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000552, 1377-
1385. 
 
